Title: Preference Alignment and Optimal Sender Ordering in Sequential Bayesian Persuasion

Speaker: Dr. RONG Kang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE)

Time: 10:30- 11:45am, May 22^nd , 2024 (Wednesday)

Venue: Room 210

Organizer: Department of Economics 

Guest Bio:

  Dr. RONG Kang is a permanent associate professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research areas include game theory, mechanism design and information design. His research work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics and other internationally recognized economics journals.

Synopsis:

  This paper studies the impact of the order of senders in the sequential Bayesian persuasion game on the receiver's equilibrium utility. We find that when senders can be ranked in terms of alignment with the receiver, it is always optimal for the receiver to put the more aligned sender before the less aligned sender. Comparative statics analysis shows that when we restrict to senders who are alignable, as the degree of misalignment between senders increases or as the number of senders increases, the receiver's equilibrium utility may decrease. In addition, we find that when senders are alignable, the sequential game performs no worse than the simultaneous game in terms of information disclosure.