Theme：Data Investment, Entry Games, and Social Welfare

Guest Speaker：Shuaicheng Liu (Nanjing University)

Time：November 20th, 2025(Thursday)，13:30-15:00 pm

Venue：Room 318, Business School Building

Organizer：The Department of Economics

Guest Bio:

  Shuaicheng Liu is an Assistant Research Fellow at the School of Digital Economy and Management, Nanjing University. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research focuses on industrial organization theory and digital economy theory. His solo-authored papers have been published in journals such as the Journal of Regulatory Economics and the B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Synopsis：

  In the digital economy era, data constitutes a vital source of corporate competitiveness. Against this backdrop, this paper employs an entry game model to analyze how incumbent firms adjust their data investments and the resulting welfare effects when facing potential entry threats. Findings reveal that depending on exogenous market conditions, incumbents may adopt either an entry deterrence strategy or an entry acceptance strategy. Compared to the baseline scenario without entry threats, data investment becomes excessive under entry deterrence, while it may be either excessive or insufficient under entry acceptance. Market entry invariably increases consumer surplus, but total social surplus may decrease. Reduced entry costs enhance total surplus only in the entry acceptance equilibrium, whereas they diminish total surplus in the entry deterrence equilibrium.