Academic

Academic

The 150th Gezhi Economic Forums

2026-11-04

Speaker: Prof. YAO Yang
Time: Nov. 4th, 2026, 10:30-11:45 am
Venue: Room 318
Organizer: School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology

Theme:Coordinating the Right-Sized Coalition: Participation Boundaries in Collective Action Experiments

Guest Speaker:Je Zheng (Shandong University)

Time:November 4th, 2026(Wednesday),10:30-11:45 am

Venue:Room 318, Business School Building

Organizer:The Department of Economics

 

Guest Bio:

Jie Zheng, a professor and doctoral supervisor at the Economic Research Institute of Shandong University; a national young talent, a special-appointed expert under the "Taishan Scholar Program" of Shandong Province, and the director of the Center for Theoretical and Experimental Economics at Shandong University (CREATE). He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in economics from Tsinghua University, and a master's and doctoral degree in economics from the University of Washington in the United States. He is the first associate editor of the international academic journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization in China, and serves as a guest editor for multiple SSCI/SCI journals. His research fields include information economics, experimental economics, behavioral economics, and industrial economics. He has led several National Natural Science Foundation projects (with continuous "outstanding" evaluations upon completion), and has delivered keynote speeches and special reports at numerous academic conferences. His research achievements have been published in renowned journals in the fields of economics, management, and natural sciences, including "Economic Research", "Games and Economic Behavior", "Management Science", and "Nature Communications".

Synopsis
:

Collective action often requires a coalition of the right size: too few participants leave the task incomplete, while too many can undermine success. In this paper, we investigate how participation requirements and tolerance for excess participation affect participation, task completion, and welfare in a theory-based laboratory experiment. Our model characterizes pure-strategy and symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in a coordination game in which successful coalition sizes form an integer interval bounded below by a participation threshold and above by an active upper boundary. The experiment varies the interval’s lower and upper boundaries across between-subject treatments, encompassing exact targets, tolerance intervals, and minimum thresholds. Overall, we find that raising the required participation target increases participation but also makes coordination more fragile, with task completion and welfare varying non-monotonically with the target. Allowing a tolerance interval yields higher task completion and welfare than requiring either of its endpoints as an exact target. These findings highlight a trade-off between mobilizing participation and maintaining coordination, suggesting that tolerance can preserve the participation gains associated with more demanding targets while limiting their coordination risks.